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10.1  Introduction 
The United  States has  considered introducing a value-added tax  (VAT) 
since at least 1966, most recently for the purpose of reducing the federal bud- 
get deficit. Since the United States currently has no federal sales tax, a VAT 
would be a net addition to the fiscal arsenal of the federal government. 
Canada, by  comparison, has had a manufacturers’ level sales tax (MST) 
since 1924, and is scheduled to replace that notoriously defective levy with a 
VAT  on January 1, 1991, provided the Senate approves the legislation passed 
by the House.’ However, there is such widespread disapproval of the VAT that 
the Senate may block the legislation-an  action it rarely takes. The proposed 
Canadian VAT  is flawed, so badly that some observers feel perhaps the VAT 
should not be approved, despite the well-known problems with the existing 
sales tax and the benefits of a well-designed VAT (See Whalley 1989). 
The Canadian debate on sales tax reform-like  sales tax debates in other 
countries-has  important lessons for the United States. In some respects the 
Canadian experience merely confirms that of  other countries. Some of  the 
lessons are more novel, reflecting the differences in the Canadian context. 
The purpose of  this paper is to discuss the most important of  these lessons. 
While the focus is on the recent debate about what kind of tax should replace 
the existing Canadian tax, the defects of the manufacturers’ tax are also dis- 
Charles E. McLure, Jr., is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and a 
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1.  On December 14, 1990, the Senate approved the legislation, and Canada  joined the ranks of 
VAT countries, as scheduled. In order to convey the sense of uncertainty that prevailed until then, 
I have not revised the text to reflect this action. The government employed extraordinary consti- 
tutional powers to appoint an additional eight members of the Senate to overcome opposition to 
the VAT. 
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cussed, since they are relevant for the U.S. debate. At various points lessons 
will be drawn from the VAT experience-including  implementation-of  Eu- 
rope, Japan, and New Zealand, which has perhaps the world’s best VAT.  I do 
not  discuss alternatives  for the  United  States, such as increases  in income 
taxes or introduction  of  a (non-Social  Security) payroll tax, since to do so 
would take me too far afield.  Not  surprisingly, I draw some conclusions for 
Canada from the debates in Canada and elsewhere. 
The traditional U.S.  discussion of introducing a VAT has also considered 
the pros and cons of introducing a federal retail sales tax (RST) instead of  a 
credit-method VAT of the type found in the European Community.2 More re- 
cently  a third horse has been added to the race, a subtraction-method VAT, 
which has commonly been called a business transfer tax (BTT). Interest in the 
BTT can only be increased by Japan’s recent adoption of a 3 percent subtrac- 
tion-based VAT.  It is sometimes suggested that the BTT should extend only 
through  the  wholesale  level, to  avoid  trespassing  on the  fiscal  turf  of  the 
states. The BTT  was also seriously considered in Canada before being aban- 
doned  in  favor of  a traditional credit-method  VAT.  Section  10.2 briefly de- 
scribes the basic mechanics of the three retail-level sales taxes (VAT, RST, and 
BTT) and the two preretail taxes mentioned above (MST and wholesale-level 
BTT), practical  differences  in  the  actual  operation  of  the three  retail-level 
taxes,  and  the  problems  with  sales taxes  such  as the  Canadian  MST or a 
wholesale level BTT, which stop short of the retail level.3 The U.S. and Ca- 
nadian  debates are briefly summarized in section  10.3; the remainder of the 
paper elaborates on key  issues in the debates.  The Canadian debate focuses 
largely on defects identified in section 10.2. 
One of the most important issues in both the U.S. and Canadian debates is 
how to introduce a federal sales tax into a federal system in which lower-level 
governments (states and provinces) already rely on retail sales taxes and resist 
the idea of federal intrusion into their fiscal preserve.  This question, which 
has been almost totally  absent from the discussion in Europe and New Zea- 
land, helps explain the interest in the BTT in both countries. It is the subject 
of section 10.4. 
Liberals  in the United  States have generally opposed introduction of the 
VAT, arguing that it would impose a heavy burden on low-income households 
and be regressive across income classes. These concerns could be lessened by 
exempting certain products  and  levying lower rates on “necessities,”  or by 
increasing  transfer  payments  to  the  poor.  An  expansion  of  the  refundable 
earned-income tax credit would be the obvious tool to use in implementing 
the latter policy in the United States. In Canada the zero-rating of  basic gro- 
2. The mechanics of these taxes are described in section 10.2, which also provides references 
to further literature. 
3. One could include discussions of a single-stage wholesale tax and a credit-method VAT that 
stops short of the retail level. Nothing much would be gained from doing so, as fortunately no one 
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ceries has been proposed, even though a program of refundable income tax 
credits has been in place since 1986. See section 10.5. 
The VAT-and  to a lesser extent any broad-based sales tax-has  the poten- 
tial of raising a large amount of money in a way that does not seriously distort 
economic decision making.  If,  however,  the tax  base is  shot through with 
exemptions and differential rates, neutrality will be lost, and complexity will 
be increased. Canada appears to be headed down a path that will produce a 
sales tax far inferior to what it could have achieved. Some of the most impor- 
tant problem areas are discussed in section 10.6. 
The preparations required for implementation of a sales tax are discussed in 
section  10.7, and the coordination of  Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. sales 
taxes in the context of a North American free-trade area is discussed in section 
10.8. The lessons from the Canadian debate are summarized in section 10.9. 
10.2  Alternative Forms of Sales Tax 
10.2.1  Retail-Level Sales Taxes 
The Basic Mechanics 
To see the difference in the three forms of sales tax that extend through the 
retail level, consider the following simple example. Suppose that a manufac- 
turer produces a product and sells it to a wholesaler for $300. The wholesaler 
sells the product  for $700 to a retailer,  who then sells it to the public for 
$1,000. Value added-the  difference between purchases and sales-is  $300 
in the manufacturing stage, $400  in wholesaling, and $300 in retailing. These 
transactions and the calculation of value added are described in the top part of 
table 10.1; the three sales taxes that extend through the retail level, each levied 
at a (tax-exclusive) rate of  10 percent, are described in the middle part of the 
table.4 (In this simple example, it is assumed that the production-distribution 
process is linear; thus, neither the manufacturer nor  the wholesaler makes 
sales to consumers and no stage sells to earlier stages. Violation of this sim- 
plifying assumption creates important differences in the effects of  the three 
types of sales taxes; these are considered later in this section.) 
Both the retail sales tax and the credit-method VAT are levied on individual 
transactions at the time of  sale. The RST applies only to the $1 ,OOO  of sales 
to consumers; thus, in the example, $100 is collected from retailers and none 
from manufacturers and wholesalers, as shown in lines 4-5  in table  10.1. 
Value  added is not actually calculated under the credit-method VAT; rather, 
tax is levied on sales, but credit is allowed for tax paid on purchases. Thus, 
for example, the wholesaler has a tentative liability of $70 (10 percent of sales 
of  $700) and credit of $30, leaving a net liability of  $40. Adding to this the 
4. The part of this example dealing with retail-level taxes is taken from McLure (1989); such 
examples are developed in greater detail in McLure (1987). 298  Charles E. McLure, Jr. 
Table 10.1  Alternative Forms of Sales Taxes 
Manufacturer  Wholesaler  Retailer  Total 
Basic Transactions (3 Stages) 
1. Sales 
2. Purchases 
3. Value Added 
Taxes Extending through the Retail Level 
10-Percent RST 
4. Retail Sales 
5. Retail Sales Tax 
6. Tax on Sales 
7. Tax on  Purchases 
8. VAT Liability 
9. Sales 
10. Purchases 
11. Value Added 
12. Business Transfer Tax 
Pre-Retail Level Sales Taxes 
33%-Percent MST 
13. Manufacturers’ Sales 
14. Manufacturers’ Sales Tax 
14.3-Percent Wholesale-Level BTT 
15. Sales 
16. Purchases 
17. Value Added 
18. Business Transfer Tax 
10-Percent Creditilnvoice VAT 


































































$30 collected from the manufacturer and the $30 collected from the retailer 
gives a total of $100, as under the RST; see lines 6-8 of table 10.1. Because 
credit can be taken only for tax shown on invoices, this tax is sometimes also 
called an invoice-based VAT. 
The subtraction-method BTT achieves the same result in a different manner, 
by  applying the  tax  rate  to  value  added  calculated at  each  stage  in  the 
production-distribution process; see lines 9-12  of table 10.1. This tax is not, 
however, levied on individual transactions; rather, it is based on the account- 
ing records of firms. 
Treatment of  International Trade 
It is important to consider what happens if  the retailer in the example ex- 
ports,  rather than  sells to  domestic consumers.  Under virtually all extant 
VATS, a zero rate is applied to exports; that is, exports are “zero-rated.” This 
means that no tax is collected on exports and the tax collected by  the whole- 299  Canadian Sales Tax 
saler is rebated to the retailer; thus, exports enter world trade unencumbered 
by VAT. 
If  imports occur at any stage in the production-distribution process, they 
are taxed, and, except in the case of imports by households, credit is allowed 
for the tax collected on  import at the time of  the first domestic sale. Thus, 
imports are taxed in the same way as domestic production. Exact “border tax 
adjustments” (BTAs) are also possible under a BTT with uniform rates applied 
to all value added, but not under one with rates that do not apply uniformly 
(see also the discussion below). 
In principle the same result is achieved automatically under the RST simply 
by  exempting export sales and including imported goods in the base of  the 
sales tax. In fact, this is not likely to be achieved completely since, as noted 
below, it is generally impossible to eliminate all tax on capital and intermedi- 
ate goods. 
Some Important Complications 
While the simple example presented above is useful in understanding the 
basic mechanics of the three types of sales taxes, it conceals important differ- 
ences in  the way  the taxes actually operate. The remainder of  this section 
examines several differences that are especially important for the discussion 
that follows. 
Problems ofRST. Not  all retail sales are made to households. To  the extent 
taxable sales are made to businesses, there can be an element of “cascading,” 
as taxes collected by  retailers are built into the price charged for business 
inputs. Instead of being neutral, RSTs impose differential burdens on various 
products, depending on the nature and  extent of  cascading. Moreover, it is 
generally impossible to free exports from RST or to burden imports with the 
same RST as domestic goods. 
Various means have been devised to avoid cascading, notably the exemp- 
tion of  certain products and the registration of  businesses, who are then al- 
lowed to buy tax-free. No system of  exemption can eliminate RST from all 
business inputs. In principle, registration for tax-free purchases can do so, but 
only by creating administrative  complications and opportunities  for abuse. 
Under the RST the tax authorities get “one bite at the apple”; that is, any 
tax not collected at the time of retail sale is lost. By  comparison, under the 
VAT  tax is collected in increments as products move through the production- 
distribution process. For this reason it is often thought that the VAT  can be 
levied at higher rates than the RST. In addition, under the credit method, in- 
voices used to verify eligibility for credits provide a mechanism for cross- 
checking that the RST lacks. These invoices create a paper trail that facilitates 
audit of the income tax, as well as the VAT.  These administrative advantages 
should not be overemphasized, because of  the possibility of claiming credit 300  Charles E. McLure, Jr. 
for tax supported by  bogus invoices and the difficulty of actually making the 
requisite C~OSS-C~~C~S.~  No tax  is truly self-enforcing. But the invoices do 
help. 
For reasons such as these, Canada opted for the multistage VAT,  instead of 
the RST (see Wilson 1987, pp. 25-27). 
Exemptions and Zero-Rating under the VAT  In this simple example, in which 
it is assumed that all value added is subject to the same uniform tax rate, the 
ultimate results are the same under the BTT as under the conventional credit- 
method VAT and the (idealized) RST. In a more realistic setting in which there 
may  be  exemptions and differential rates,  equivalence quickly  evaporates. 
This is most easily seen by considering what happens under the two types of 
VAT  when there is exemption or zero-rating of  the one stage in  the above 
example. 
Under certain circumstances either exemption or zero-rating can create po- 
tentially severe administrative problems. The easiest case is exemption of the 
entire activity of  a business; the exempt business is simply “out of  the sys- 
tem,” and thus pays no tax on sales and receives no credit for tax paid on 
purchases. The situation is significantly more complicated for a business that 
makes both taxable and exempt sales (and thus is in the system). It is neces- 
sary to distinguish between purchases related to taxable and to exempt sales, 
since credit is allowed only for tax paid on the former; in some cases it is 
necessary to use formulas to apportion taxes on purchases between taxable 
and exempt activities. A business making zero-rated sales is “in the system,” 
and must bear the same administrative burden as a fully taxable business. But 
there is no need to distinguish between purchases related to taxable and zero- 
rated sales, since credit is allowed for taxes on both. 
Exemption of retail sales under the credit-method VAT  eliminates the tax 
on the value added at the retail level, but not that collected at earlier stages. 
By comparison, zero-rating retail sales eliminates the entire tax on such sales. 
It is equivalent to exemption under the (ideal) RST. 
If  the wholesale stage is exempt, aggregate VAT  liability actually rises, to 
$130 in the example. Because the wholesaler is not a taxpayer, no credit is 
allowed for the $30 tax on purchases; on the other hand, the retailer collects 
$100 and has paid no tax on purchases for which to take credit. Because of 
this break in the chain of credits, pre-retail exemptions are not popular under 
the credit-method VAT. 
Zero-rating (or another preferential rate) applied to pre-retail sales, on the 
other hand, has no effect on ultimate tax liability, since only the rate applied 
5. It has been suggested that small-business opposition to the credit-method VAT helps explain 
why the government of Japan decided not to impose such a tax, opting instead for a subtraction- 
method VAT operating without invoices. Homma (1992) and Noguchi (1992) suggest this inter- 
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at retail actually matters under a credit-method VAT.  If  pre-retail taxes are 
lower, credits are lower as well. 
Problems of Bn.  The results are very different under the BTT.6 Since tax is 
levied on “slices” of value added, the exemption or preferential taxation of  a 
given stage reduces aggregate tax liability (but cannot eliminate it unless all 
stages are exempt) and distorts resource allocation. This produces incentives 
to lobby for preferential treatment, which in turn means that a subtraction- 
method VAT  is not likely to be neutral. It is also generally impossible to pro- 
vide accurate BTAs under the BTT if the base is not comprehensive and the 
rate is not uniform. (Suppose that one slice of value added incorporated into 
production for exports or competition with imports is taxed at 10 percent, one 
is exempt, and another is taxed at 4 percent. How is the exporter to calculate 
the export rebate? What rate should be applied to competing imports? What if 
the slices differ in size for different production-distribution channels?) Finally, 
there are important administrative questions of defining just which activities 
benefit from the exemption or preferential rates. 
Some have suggested that the inability of the BTT to accommodate multiple 
rates  and  exemptions is one of  its advantages-that  this form of  taxation 
forces politicians to apply a single rate to all economic activity. Experience, 
most notably the Canadian elimination of the option patterned after the BTT, 
which was acknowledged to be workable only with a single rate and a broad 
base, seems to support my view that one cannot be so optimistic-that  politi- 
cians will not easily be dissuaded from doing what they want to do simply 
because it is technically impossible. It will be interesting to see whether Japan 
can maintain the relative purity and uniformity of  its new  subtraction-based 
tax, especially if  the rate rises above its present low level of  3 percent. (See 
Homma 1992, where it is explicitly recognized that virtually all value added 
must be taxed at one rate under the Japanese tax.) 
There remains another area of uncertainty: the treatment of  the BTT under 
article 3 of  the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which deals with 
“national treatment.” This provision allows BTAs for indirect taxes, but not 
for direct taxes.  A BTT resembles an indirect tax in  some respects; under 
certain circumstances it is exactly equivalent to a credit-method VAT  or an 
RST, taxes for which BTAs are allowed. But the BTT also has characteristics 
of a direct tax;  in particular, the tax base is calculated as the difference be- 
tween receipts and purchases. Moreover, the effects of  differential rates are 
felt by  taxpayers, rather than washing out, as under the credit method (see 
Carlson and  McLure  1984; McLure  1989). It  is  not  clear how  the GATT 
would react to a BTT, but the new Japanese subtraction-based tax may shed 
some light on the issue, especially if there is a shift to nonuniform rates. 
6. This discussion is necessarily incomplete. See McLure (1987, ch. 6)  for a more complete 
indictment of the BTT. 302  Charles E. McLure, Jr. 
Both the credit-method VAT  and the RST have a further advantage not 
shared by the BTT. Whereas the VAT  is almost inherently visible, because of 
the need for separate quotation on invoices, and the RST is commonly quoted 
separately, the account-based BTT is invisible. Thus, consumers are much 
less likely to know the tax content of goods and services subject to BTT than 
that of goods and services subject to RST or VAT. 
10.2.2  Re-retail Sales Taxes 
The Mechanics 
The Canadian MST is applied to sales by manufacturers. In the example in 
table 10.1, a rate of 33  1/3/ percent would be required to produce the same 
revenue as the  10 percent rate applied to retail sales (see table  10.1, lines 
A BTT limited to the wholesale level would be a truncated version of the 
BTT  illustrated in the top part of table 10.1; thus, it would apply only to value 
added at the manufacturing and wholesale stages (see lines 15-18).  To  raise 
the same revenue as the  10 percent retail-level  tax, a rate of  14.3 percent 
would be required. 
1  3-1  4). 
Problems 
Any  tax that does not extend to the retail level inevitably raises difficult 
definitional problems: What is manufacturing, or wholesaling, and what is 
not? In addition, pre-retail taxes discriminate against those activities in which 
the value is added early in the production-distribution process; discrimination 
in favor of services is especially severe. Pre-retail taxes encourage the artifi- 
cial shifting of functions from the taxable (manufacturing or wholesale) stage 
to nontaxable stages. In the case of vertically integrated activities extending 
beyond the last taxable point, transfer prices must be employed to determine 
tax liability, absorbing resources and opening the way for evasion. Since there 
is no way for businesses beyond the last taxable point to recover tax paid on 
business inputs, cascading occurs. This distorts resource allocation and pre- 
vents accurate BTAs, causing discrimination against domestic manufacturers 
in international markets. Efforts to prevent cascading produce the same prob- 
lems as are produced under the RST.  Moreover, whereas the rate applied to 
business imports under the credit-method VAT  makes no ultimate difference, 
this is not true under pre-retail taxes. It is for reasons such as these that the 
U.S. Treasury Department (1984, vol. 3, p. 217), concluded: “The retail sales 
tax and a value-added tax extending through the retail level are the only types 
of sales tax that should be considered. . . . The United States should categor- 
ically reject: a single stage tax levied before the retail level, such as a manu- 
facturers or wholesale tax; a value-added tax that does not include the retail 
stage. . . .” 303  Canadian Sales Tax 
10.3  Some History 
10.3.1  United States 
In 1966 a conservative business group, the Committee for Economic Devel- 
opment, proposed that the United States replace its corporate income tax with 
a value-added tax (see Committee for Economic Development 1966; see also 
McLure 1973 and 1987, ch. 1). Much of the impetus for the proposal was the 
belief that such a substitution would improve the U.S. balance of payments. 
To some extent this belief was a misunderstanding of the purpose and effect of 
the BTAs allowed for the newly enacted European VATS; BTAs were seen by 
some as export subsidies and import tariffs. In any event there was interest in 
replacing a tax for which BTAs are not allowed under the GATT (the corporate 
tax) with one for which BTAs are allowed (the VAT).’ 
Nothing much came of this idea, and the idea of a U.S. VAT  lay dormant 
until  1972. It was  revived when President Richard Nixon suggested that a 
federal VAT  be  used to replace revenues from local property taxes,  which 
were under judicial attack. Although a blue-ribbon committee appointed by 
the president issued a report on the topic, the report was largely ignored as the 
president and the public became preoccupied with Watergate. 
The idea of a U.S. VAT  surfaced again in  1979, when A1  Ullman, then 
Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, proposed the Revenue 
Act of  1979. Since Ullman’s electoral defeat in  1980, members of  Congress 
have been chary about supporting a VAT.  Nonetheless, in 1986 Senator Roth 
(R-Delaware) proposed the introduction of a Business Transfer Tax. 
During the 1980s the BTT has been advocated especially by the American 
Council for Capital Formation,  as a means of  reducing the federal budget 
deficit and thus increasing total (private plus public) saving. The wholesale- 
level BTT was chosen over the conventional credit-method VAT  in large part 
to avoid appearing to step on the fiscal toes of  state and local governments. 
The accounts-based BTT  is also said to be  simpler to implement than the 
credit-method VAT. 
Neither the U.S. Treasury Department nor the Internal Revenue Service 
participated in the debate, even though the latter would presumably be respon- 
sible for implementation of any federal sales tax.* To remedy this, examina- 
tion of  a value-added tax was included in the Treasury Department’s tax re- 
form project that eventually led to the Tax  Reform Act of  1986.9 Nothing 
7. The discussion at the conference revealed a new twist to this old issue. Some in the Canadian 
government fear that the United States might use a VAT or another form of sales tax to reduce its 
corporate tax rates. Capital and tax base might then be attracted from Canada, in the absence of 
matching rate reductions by Canada. See also the papers by Gordon and by  Boadway and Bruce 
(chs. 2 and  1 in this volume). 
8. Carlson (1980) was written while its author was an employee of the Treasury Department, 
but it was not an  official departmental study. 
9. See U.S.  Department of the Treasury (1984 especially vol. 3). 304  Charles E. McLure, Jr. 
came of this effort, since President Reagan had decreed that tax reform would 
be revenue-neutral, and no one would have seriously-or  at least credibly- 
suggested that a VAT  be introduced except as part of  an effort to reduce the 
deficit. 
10.3.2  Canada 
Canada’s manufacturers’ sales tax has long been widely recognized as one 
of  the worst sales taxes levied by  any advanced country.’O After an effort to 
eliminate the tax was rendered ineffective by  the revenue needs of the Great 
Depression, the tax was gradually accepted as a permanent part of the Cana- 
dian  fiscal  landscape.  The  defects of  the  tax  have  been  documented and 
changes have been suggested by several high-level commissions: the Rowell- 
Sirois Commission on  Dominion-Provincial Relations in  1940, the  Royal 
Commission on Taxation (the Carter Commission) in  1966, and the Federal 
Sales Tax Review Committee (the Goodman Committee) in  1983.IL 
In June 1987, Finance Minister Michael Wilson proposed replacing the ex- 
isting sales tax, which he described as “seriously flawed,” with a value-added 
tax. Wilson’s indictment of the MST was similar to the criticisms I presented 
in the last part of section 10.2. He argued that switching to a VAT  would help 
Canadian industry compete in foreign and domestic markets and improve the 
balance of revenue sources (Wilson 1987, p. l).l2 
The base of  the manufacturers’ tax is extremely limited; only about one- 
third of consumption is directly affected by the tax, and five items (tobacco, 
alcoholic beverages, automobiles, automobile parts, and motor fuels) account 
for 40 percent of revenues.13  “Complexity arises because the tax is not applied 
to all products and because the distinction between taxable and exempt items 
is often difficult to define and to sustain,” according to Wilson (1987, p. 19).14 
10.  For example, Due (1959), a textbook I used as an undergraduate student almost thirty years 
ago, catalogs the defects of the tax, as well as efforts made through 1955 to replace it with a more 
rational alternative. 
11.  Gillis (1985) and Whalley (1989) provide modem surveys of the defects of the existing 
MST, which have led Gillis to quip that “Canada is a civilized country, except for its sales tax”. It 
might be noted that the defects of the MST have assumed even greater importance in recent years, 
as the rate has risen to 13.5 percent from 9 percent as recently as 1984. I appreciate Jon Kessel- 
man’s pointing this out to me. 
12.  Wilson (1989a, p. 5) stated, with only slight exaggeration, “The existing tax is the only 
consumption tax in the industrialized world known to favor imports over domestically produced 
13. Perhaps  it  should be  noted that no VAT reaches all consumption spending; because of 
exemptions and zero rates a figure of  one-half to three-fourths of consumption would be more 
typical. 
14. Wilson cites the following examples of  line-drawing: athletic headbands are exempt as 
clothing, while athletic wrist bands are taxable as sporting equipment; the ripening of green ba- 
nanas and the blasting of rock into rubble are both classified as manufacturing (to the benefit of 
taxpayers). He also mentions the following questions raised by  court cases: If heating fuels are 
exempt, should candles be exempt because they produce heat? If  electricity is not taxed, should 
batteries be exempt as boxed electricity? Should facial tissues be taxed as a cosmetic or exempt as 
a health good? 
goods.” 305  Canadian Sales Tax 
Because the tax is levied at the manufacturing level, almost half of  it falls on 
business inputs in the first instance. The tax  is hidden from the consumers 
who ultimately pay it, but cascades into highly differentiated taxation of vari- 
ous products and even the same product made by  different manufacturers in 
the same industry. As Wilson noted, the existing system “taxes goods capri- 
ciously, scattering and compounding its impact through the distribution chain 
in a frequently unpredictable manner” (Wilson 1989a, p. 4). There are esti- 
mates that these distortions cause a loss of  efficiency of  $9 billion annually, 
the equivalent of the value added by  Canada’s manufacturers of steel, alumi- 
num, and other primary metals. 
The tax also distorts choices of distribution channels. In the effort to pre- 
vent distortions of  trading patterns, “notional values” (or transfer prices) are 
used to approximate values at the manufacturing level, creating further com- 
plexity. One measure of the complexity of the system is the fact that 22,000 
special provisions and administrative interpretations have been issued for a 
system with only 75,000 taxpayers (Wilson 1987, pp. 10-1 1, 23). 
Wilson proposed replacing the manufacturers’ sales tax with a value-added 
tax, rather than with a retail sales tax, citing the difficulty of removing all tax 
on business inputs under the RST and the greater susceptibility to noncompli- 
ance (Wilson 1987, pp. 25-27;  Wilson 1989a, p. 14). (Though not mentioned 
explicitly by  Wilson, the potential for strong opposition from the provinces, 
which levy retail sales taxes, almost certainly also motivated the decision to 
recommend a VAT.) He offered three alternatives for further debate: a credit- 
method VAT that would absorb provincial sales taxes, a uniform-rate compre- 
hensive federal tax that would closely resemble a BTT and operate without 
invoices, and a conventional credit-method federal VAT.  (These are described 
in greater detail in the next section.) 
By April 1989, the menu had been pared down to only one alternative, the 
credit-method VAT,  which is now being called the Goods and Services Tax 
(GST). Interestingly enough, deficit reduction was added to the listed virtues 
of  the VAT.  This addition has caused some (e.g., Whalley  1989) to wonder 
whether the true reason for the proposed VAT  substitution for the MST is 
long-run revenue enhancement, rather than simply structural improvement. 
Though the initial proposal was for a rate of 9 percent, it has since been re- 
duced to 7 percent. 
It is worth noting that simply eliminating the MST and replacing its revenue 
with revenue from the individual and corporate income taxes seems to have 
been ruled out because of  the implied change in the “tax mix” from indirect 
taxation to direct taxation.I5 
15.  This point is noted in Whalley (1989) and in Dodge and Sargent (1988, p. 53). See Kessel- 
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10.4  Intergovernmental Issues 
10.4.1  The U.S. Issues 
The states have long been  uneasy about the prospect of a federal value- 
added tax.  l6  Concerns about “federal preemption” may often have been poorly 
articulated; they have to do with the amount of room that exists for two juris- 
dictions to tax the same base. In fact, it appears that there is something very 
real behind these concerns. 
First, and most obviously, if federal and state rates were added together, the 
total rate applied to any one sale might be so high that evasion would become 
extremely attractive and thus very difficult to control. At  the very  least, it 
might be necessary to rely on the techniques of the VAT,  which leaves more 
of  a paper trail for auditors than the RST.  This might be disconcerting to 
states, who have an RST tradition. 
Second, it is clearly more trouble for businesses to comply with two sales 
taxes than with one. Difficulties would be maximized, all else equal, if  the 
states and the federal government chose different forms of transactions-based 
sales tax  (e.g., state  RST  and  federal  VAT).  Difficulties would  be  com- 
pounded if the taxes levied by the two levels of government involved different 
patterns of exemptions and rate differentiation. Sales personnel would have to 
know the rules for both taxes.”  In order to avoid maddening complexity for 
business,  a  high  degree of  intergovernmental cooperation and  uniformity 
would be needed. In the extreme case, states would be allowed to choose no 
more than rates, the base having been chosen by the federal government. But 
this solution involves a loss of state fiscal sovereignty. 
By  comparison, if  the federal government employed the accounts-based 
BTT, intergovernmental problems would be minimized. Salespersons would 
need to be concerned only with the rules for the state RST, leaving the com- 
plexity of the BTT to the accountants to worry about. There is also much less 
need for uniformity and cooperation, and thus less concern about loss of state 
fiscal sovereignty. The fly in this ointment is, of course, the basic difficulties 
posed by a BTT that is not levied at a single rate on all value added. There is 
little reason to believe that the Congress would resist the temptation to levy 
multiple rates. 
10.4.2  The Canadian Debate 
The concerns identified above also existed in Canada, though perhaps to a 
lesser degree. As a result, the April 1987 proposal (Wilson 1987) contained 
16. This discussion is based on McLure (1987, ch. 9) and McLure (1988). See U.S.  General 
Accounting Office (1990) for the results of  a survey of  views of  state policy makers and tax 
administrators. 
17. Modern technology (bar codes and holography) reduces the importance of this problem, 
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not one but three alternatives for consideration. The first of these was called a 
“national  sales tax”; it was a credit-method value-added tax administered by 
the federal government with rates that could vary by province. It would, at the 
option of the  individual  provinces,  replace  both  the  federal  and  provincial 
sales taxes (see Wilson 1987, pp. 54). 
Taxes on interprovincial trade would be handled through a central collec- 
tion agency acting as a clearing house. Each invoice issued for sales to busi- 
nesses would show the province of origin and the province of destination of 
the sale; tax would be charged at the rate prevailing in the province of desti- 
nation (plus the federal rate). The central agency would then credit provincial 
accounts for tax  at destination  and debit them  for tax at origin of  business 
sales.18 The federal and provincial tax bases would need to be identical for 
this scheme to work. 
An approach such as this has been considered by the European Community 
as part of its “1992  scheme” to “complete the internal market.” There has, 
however, been a reluctance to adopt such a scheme, which would require mu- 
tual honesty and trust, as well as considerable sacrifice of national fiscal sov- 
ereignty. It appears that there is reluctance to trust either the taxpayers or the 
fiscal authorities of other member nations (see Tait  1988, pp.  158-61;  Culp 
1989). 
The second alternative was essentially a federal BTT, “which would be lev- 
ied at a single rate on virtually all goods and services in Canada, with minimal 
exceptions.” l9 It was anticipated that “this system could operate without in- 
voices.” (The mechanics were those of the credit method. But credit was cal- 
culated as the product of the tax rate and taxable inputs. Of course, it could 
operate without  invoices only if, indeed, virtually  all sales were subject to 
tax.) For reasons indicated above, such a tax could operate in parallel with 
existing provincial RSTs (see Wilson 1987, pp. 54-57). 
The third  alternative  was  a  federal  credit-method  VAT  similar to  those 
found in Europe. This tax would have the advantage of allowing exemptions 
(and differential rates, something not mentioned by Wilson), but the disadvan- 
tage of posing greater administrative burdens on retailers.  It was recognized 
that some retailers would find it necessary to replace their cash registers with 
newer, more sophisticated ones capable of recording sales in four categories.20 
18.  This is based on Podddr (1990) and Cnossen (1983, 1990). It is summarized in Whalley 
and Fretz (1990, p. 83). Note that this technique avoids the need to employ the “restricted origin 
principle” of the Neumark Committee, in which all provinces would be required to levy VAT at a 
uniform rate (see Cnossen 1983, 1990). 
19. This option was called the Goods and Services Tax, or GST. Since this name was later 
given to the credit-method VAT proposed in  1989, it is not used in this paper, in order to avoid 
confusion. 
20.  See Wilson (1987, pp. 57-58).  It is worth noting that on August 8, 1989, in conjunction 
with release of the Technical Paper on the GST, Wilson proposed immediate write-off for equip- 
ment for scanning electronic bar codes and for cash registers capable of  calculating and recording 
sales taxes imposed by  more than one jurisdiction. See “Changes to Capital Cost Allowance Rate 
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The government ultimately settled on the federal credit-method VAT, which 
it is now calling the Goods and Services Tax (GST). It is worth commenting 
briefly on two alternatives that did not appear on this list. First, there was no 
federal RST, presumably because of the expectation of severe opposition from 
the provinces, as well as the problems identified above. Second, there was no 
proposal for a joint federal-provincial BTT. Given existing differences in pro- 
vincial sales tax rates, there would seem to be little hope for a uniform rate, 
without which the BTT cannot operate (see Whalley and Fretz 1990, p. 83). 
At the end of  August 1990, after the presentation and penultimate revision 
of this paper, another important development occurred. The governments of 
Canada and Quebec signed an agreement for the joint collection of federal and 
provincial sales taxes. While appearing on the surface to be a promising de- 
velopment, this action left some important questions unanswered.*’ 
First, it is far from obvious what the Memorandum of Understanding means 
when it speaks of Quebec making “a change from a retail  sales tax to a tax 
harmonized with the GST.” In particular, there is no indication how interprov- 
incial trade will be treated. Second, it is anomalous-if  understandable in the 
unique Canadian situation involving relations with Quebec-that  the provin- 
cial government is given responsibility  for administration of  the federal tax. 
One would ordinarily prefer federal administration of provincial taxes in order 
to assure uniformity and prevent provincial favoritism to local business. 
10.5  Low-Income Relief 
10.5.1  The U.S. Debate 
The discussion  of the VAT prepared  by  the U.S. Treasury Department  in 
1984 considered three ways of dealing with the distributional problem posed 
by  sales tax burdens  on low-income households  and regressivity.22 It  noted 
that exemptions of  food and other necessities are extremely blunt and ineffi- 
cient instruments to use for this purpose. First, most food is not consumed by 
the poor, and tax rates must be substantially higher to make up for the loss in 
tax base. Second, exempting food distorts consumer choices. Third, exemp- 
tions pose troublesome administrative problems. It concluded that other ways 
should be found to deal with the problem. 
To the extent that transfer payments are indexed for inflation or are made in 
kind, recipients  of  transfers  would  not  be harmed by the  introduction of  a 
federal VAT.  But not  all the poor receive transfers.  Thus, it was concluded 
21.  This discussion is based on “Wilson Announces Sales Tax Reform Agreement with Que- 
bec” (1990), a news release that also includes the Memorandum of  Understanding, exchange of 
letters, Wilson’s statement on the Memorandum of Understanding, and background information. 
22.  For an analysis extending that found in U.S. Department of  the Treasury (1984). see Bras- 
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that it would be necessary to accompany introduction of a VAT  with a com- 
prehensive program of direct transfers, such as a negative income tax, if  the 
poor were to be insulated from the effects of the VAT.  Expansion of the exist- 
ing earned-income tax credit under the individual income tax would be one 
way to implement such a program. 
10.5.2  The Canadian Resolution 
cluded that: 
The report of  a conference held at the Brookings Institution in 1980 con- 
The central technical lesson of  the European experience is that multiple 
rates can be used to eliminate the regressivity of  the value-added tax, but 
that the penalties in administrative complexity, increased compliance costs, 
and distortions in consumption decisions have been high and probably un- 
justified. Most conference participants agreed . . . that it would be prefer- 
able to use other taxes and transfer payments to alleviate the undesirable 
distributional consequences generated by a value added tax imposed at uni- 
formrates. (Aaron 1981, p. 16) 
Yet  the conference participants did not hold out much hope that the United 
States would resist the temptation to impose preferential rates on such neces- 
sities as food, housing, and medicine. 
Canadian experience certainly does not provide reason for optimism on this 
score. The  1989 Canadian proposal would  zero-rate basic groceries, even 
though there exists a refundable sales tax credit for the poor, first enacted in 
1986 and subsequently made much more generous.23  This approach, said to 
be necessary to gain provincial acceptance of the federal tax base, promises to 
create the problems identified above, which  were explicitly recognized by 
Wilson (1989a, p. 21). 
The zero-rating of  groceries doomed any prospect of  using the BTT ap- 
proach. Moreover, as European experience with zero-rating, multiple rates, 
and exemptions makes clear, it creates substantial difficulties of  compliance 
and administration. This is especially sad, since the existence of  the refunda- 
ble credit mechanism should have made the zero-rating of groceries unneces- 
sary. This problem is discussed further in the next section. 
23. At the time of the initial Wilson proposal in 1987, refundable credits of $50 per adult and 
$25 per child were allowed families with incomes below $15,000, with the credit being reduced 
by  5 percent of the excess of income over $15,000. Under the initial 1987 proposal, the credit 
would be increased by  $20 for adults and $10 for children and the ceiling increased to $16,000. 
See Wilson (1987, p. 7). The figures for 1990 were increased to $140 for adults and $70 for 
children, with a ceiling of  $18.000. In the August 1989 proposal, the figures were $275 for adults 
and $100 for children, with a ceiling of about $25,000. See Wilson (1989b, pp. 3, 15-16). 
During the conference it  was noted that the New Zealand GST, which applies to food, was 
introduced by a socialist government. Whereas it might be possible for a Democratic administra- 
tion in the United States to propose such a tax successfully, it would be much more difficult for a 
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10.6  Neutrality 
The proposed Canadian VAT falls far short of neutrality. In addition to zero- 
rating basic groceries, prescription drugs, and medical devices, it would ex- 
empt residential rents, most health and dental services, day care services, le- 
gal aid services, and most educational services. In addition, public sector in- 
stitutions (hospitals, local governments, libraries, colleges, and universities) 
would receive rebates for a percentage of the taxes paid on their purchases, in 
order to avoid an increase in the sales taxes they pay.  Sales by  farmers and 
fishermen would be zero-rated in order to facilitate zero-rating of groceries. 
Financial institutions would be tax-exempt, except on specific services. Fi- 
nally, businesses with turnover below $30,000 per year would have the option 
of being exempt. This section examines several of these key issues in greater 
detail. 
10.6.1  Food 
Under the proposed legislation, basic groceries will be zero-rated through- 
out the production-distribution process. Rather than defining basic groceries, 
the law specifies that the following categories of  food will be taxable: candy 
and confectioneries, snack food, soft drinks, prepared food sold in a grocery 
store, and all food sold in eating establishments, except those not suitable for 
immediate consumption (e.g., coffee beans). This list is essentially the same 
as the list of goods that are taxable under the existing MST. In addition, meals 
offered by  schools, universities, charities, nursing homes, and other such in- 
stitutions will be exempt. Two  streamlined methods of  accounting are pro- 
vided to facilitate small-business compliance with the law. 
The approach chosen in Canada has little to recommend it. As noted above, 
there is little reason to exempt groceries, given the existence of  the system of 
refundable credits; doing so creates unnecessary complexity. Even the Con- 
sumers Association of  Canada favored taxing food, with a compensating re- 
duction in rates (noted in Whalley and Fretz 1990, p. 70). 
Beyond that, if a food exemption is to be provided, it makes little sense to 
limit the exemption to basic groceries; it is hard to see what this achieves, and 
it creates serious problems of compliance and administrati~n.~~  Certainly Wil- 
son’s statement does not offer adequate justification: “Consistent with their 
treatment under the existing federal sales tax, soft drinks ,  candies and confec- 
tions, and snack foods will continue to be taxable” (Wilson 1989b, p. 11). It 
would have been much simpler to exempt all food, and the implied loss of 
revenue probably would not have been great. 
10.6.2  Housing 
The 1987 proposals called for a tax on new residential construction and on 
the sale or rental of real estate for commercial use; residential rentals and the 
24.  Wilson (1990, p.  12) acknowledges,  “There are some food products that are not easily 
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resale of residential real estate would be exempt (Wilson 1987, p.  113). The 
1989 legislation is similar to the 1987 proposal, but contains rebates intended 
to soften the blow to low-income home buyers from the increase in taxation 
of housing caused by the switch from the MST to the GST. It provides a rebate 
of  36 percent of  GST (just over 2.5 percent of  the purchase price), up to a 
maximum of  $8,750,  on a new house with a price of  up to $350,000. The 
rebate is phased out on a proportionate basis over the range of housing prices 
to $450,000.25 
This proposal raises several questions for the United States. First, the ap- 
proach proposed for Canada would create capital gains for owners of existing 
residential real estate, to the extent the GST on housing exceeds the tax in- 
cluded in the value of housing under the MST. An alternative that would avoid 
these windfall gains would include in the tax base the first sale of  any home. 
Such an approach would also substantially increase the tax base and allow 
lower rates. It is not without problems, however. It would be necessary for 
homeowners to keep track of  the  cost of  improvements incurred after the 
introduction of the VAT-and  to distinguish them from nondeductible main- 
tenance-in  order to avoid double taxation (Whalley and Fretz 1990, pp. 79- 
82). And,  of  course,  it would be  politically unpopular with homeowners. 
Second, the inclusion of  land in the value of new houses subject to GST cre- 
ates some distortions or inequities. Tax would be saved by buying an existing 
house, demolishing it, and contracting for the construction of a new house. 
The rebate scheme proposed for Canada is also problematic. It would im- 
pose an effective marginal tax rate of  15.75 percent (7 percent GST, plus the 
phaseout rate of 8.75 percent) on new housing with purchase prices falling in 
the phaseout range of $350,000-450,000.26 Rates of this magnitude, besides 
creating obvious distortions of  economic decisions, would almost certainly 
give rise to eva~ion.~’  The preferential rate on housing included in Ullman’s 
1979 proposal might be preferable, if relief must be offered. 
10.6.3  Financial Services 
The  financial  sector  poses  difficult problems  under  any  credit-method 
VAT.28  Value added in this sector is measured by the sum of  the spread be- 
tween interest received and interest paid and charges for nonfinancial services, 
25.  The 1989 proposals called for a rebate of 4.5 percent of the purchase price up to $310,000, 
phased out on homes valued between $350,000 and $400,000; see Wilson (1989b. pp.  17-20). 
26.  Under the 1987 proposal,  the implicit tax would have been a staggering 36.9 percent (9 
percent GST,  plus the phaseout rate of 27.9 percent). 
27.  One would expect, for example, that the purchaser of a home valued in the phaseout range 
would conspire with the seller to pay only $350,000 for the home and pay  the rest of  the true 
purchase price for something else in order to maximize the rebate. One commentator thought this 
type of gimmick would not work, because land prices and building costs are well established in 
Canada. 
28.  For an excellent discussion of various approaches to the taxation of financial services and 
their problems, see Hoffman, Poddar, and Whalley (1987). Similar problems are encountered in 
the case of  insurance.  They are not discussed here, for lack of space. See, however, Barham, 
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less costs of providing both financial and nonfinancial services. Both types of 
services are provided to both businesses and households. I; will be convenient 
in what follows to focus primarily on value added in intermediation, ignoring 
for the most part nonfinancial services and their costs. It is recognized fully 
that  we  are  setting aside  important  administrative problems: that  explicit 
charges may not be made for such services, and that there are problems of 
allocating costs between types of  service. Such problems are especially im- 
portant, for example, for integrated financial institutions, such as banks, and 
for realtors. 
The objective of policy in the purely financial sphere is ideally to tax inter- 
mediation services, allow businesses a credit for the tax on such services, and 
allow financial institutions a credit for taxes on purchased inputs. The prob- 
lem is that interest payments involve both a pure interest charge, which should 
not be taxed under a consumption-based VAT,  and a charge for financial inter- 
mediation, which should be.29  It is difficult to determine what part of interest 
charges should be subject to VAT  (see Hoffman, Poddar, and Whalley 1987, 
Zero-rating would be an ideal solution if  all financial services were offered 
to businesses. But to the extent financial services are offered to consumers, 
zero-rating loses revenue and may be seen as undesirable discrimination fa- 
voring the financial sector. This could be handled with a separate tax on  fi- 
nancial  transactions with  households, but only  at  the  cost of  considerable 
complexity, including the need to segregate business and nonbusiness trans- 
actions. 
The common European practice in dealing with this problem is to exempt 
financial institutions, but to zero-rate foreign transactions for competitive rea- 
sons. That is, interest is treated as it is in  other sectors (not taxed and thus 
carrying no credit), and (except for expenses of  foreign lending) no credit is 
allowed  for  purchases.  This  treatment  of  domestic lending  discriminates 
against financial services offered to business, since, as noted above, exemp- 
tion of pre-retail activities creates a burden, rather than a benefit; this may be 
especially onerous and undesirable, given the competitive pressure from for- 
eign financial institutions. Moreover, it is necessary to distinguish between 
taxable nonfinancial services and exempt financial services, and some favor- 
itism for consumer services would remain. 
It is sometimes proposed that the addition or subtraction methods be em- 
ployed to impose what is, in effect, a separate tax on the financial 
This does not solve the problem of allowing credits for purchasers of financial 
services. In addition, under either of these approaches it would be necessary 
pp. 547-48). 
29.  It is not universally agreed that household costs of intermediation should be subject to tax. 
This issue was hotly debated within the Finance Ministry of Canada. 
30.  The addition method of implementing a VAT involves adding together the various compo- 
nents of  value  added. As  noted in  McLure (1987, p. 102, n. 40),  the addition and subtraction 
methods are closely related. 313  Canadian Sales Tax 
to construct border tax adjustments to avoid competitive disadvantage for do- 
mestic financial institutions. 
The  only  conceptually attractive and  administratively feasible approach 
seems to be one based on cash flow to and from financial institutions. Unfor- 
tunately, it suffers from perception problems that are probably fatal. 
Canada has wrestled at length with this problem; indeed, one of  the most 
perceptive analyses of the problem (Hoffman, Poddar, and Whalley 1987) was 
prepared in the Ministry of Finance. The initial 1987 White Paper proposed to 
utilize the subtraction method for financial institutions, that is, to levy the tax 
on revenues from implicit charges represented by  the margin on financial in- 
termediation (Wilson 1987, pp.  130-31).  Customers of financial institutions 
would be allowed no credit for such taxes, since they are not computed on a 
transactions basis. Services provided to nonresidents would be zero-rated (see 
also Clarkson Gordon 1989). 
Apparently because of insurmountable technical difficulties, the 1989 pro- 
posals retreated to the conventional treatment of the financial sector-exemp- 
tion of  services rendered to residents and zero-rating of  services to nonresi- 
dents (Wilson 1989a, p. 14; see also Clarkson Gordon 1989, Ernst and Young 
1990). 
It is difficult to know what lesson to draw from the Canadian experience in 
this area, except that the taxation of financial institutions is, indeed, difficult. 
Perhaps we can do no better than agree with Yolanda Henderson’s (1988) con- 
clusion: 
If policymakers are concerned mostly with totally avoiding a tax on saving 
and with simplifying the VAT  rules, then deciding to exempt financial in- 
termediaries is a reasonable compromise. If they are instead concerned with 
creating parity  of  treatment between  financial  intermediation and  other 
goods and services, then they should consider using the subtraction-method 
VAT  for intermediaries and formulating rules that provide credits to busi- 
ness users of these services. 
10.6.4  Nonprofit Activities 
Many nonprofit organizations engage in commercial activities (e.g., book- 
stores, cafeterias), as well as in the activities that give rise to their tax-exempt 
status under the income tax (e.g., health care, education). While the commer- 
cial activities should be taxable, it is commonly felt that the noncommercial 
activities should not be taxed. Nontaxation can take the form of either exemp- 
tion or zero-rating. In the former case, tax is paid on purchases, for which no 
credit is allowed. 
Canada has chosen to deal with this problem in a particularly complicated 
manner. Commercial activities will be taxed, with credit for input taxes. Other 
activities will be exempt, but to prevent the switch from the MST to the GST 
from either increasing or decreasing the tax burden on such activities, partial 
rebates of input taxes will be provided to certain organizations (e.g., regis- 314  Charles E. McLure, Jr. 
tered charities, certain government-subsidized organizations). The standard 
rebate rate will be 50 percent, but special rebate rates are to be determined for 
each of the following four sectors providing exempt services: municipalities, 
universities, schools, and hospitals (the so-called MUSH sector). Allowing 
only partial credit means that research and education functions in the MUSH 
sector will taxed more heavily than in the private sector and more heavily than 
private investment in physical capital. There has been support for a less com- 
plex and more neutral approach, such as zero-rating. But this would result in 
a net transfer from the federal to subnational governments. 
10.6.5  Small-Business Exemption 
Several studies have indicated that small businesses find compliance with 
the VAT  to be particularly burdensome, especially relative to large firms (see 
Sandford et al.  1981; Sandford and Godwin 1990). The 1984 Treasury De- 
partment  study (1984,  vol.  3, p.  61), concluded, however,  that no small- 
business exemption would be needed in the United States. 
The 1987 Canadian proposal for a federal GST called for making a small- 
business exemption available to firms with annual turnover of  no more than 
$5,000 (Wilson 1987, p. 97).31  The turnover figure was raised to $30,000 in 
the 1989 proposals. Firms with turnover below this level would be allowed to 
apply for registration, in order to avoid breaks in the chain of credits. Simpli- 
fied  accounting techniques (under which  liability  would be  based on  pur- 
chases, rather than on sales) would be available to small businesses, and those 
with sales below $50,000 would only be required to file annual reports (with 
quarterly payment of  In  addition,  it was  suggested that  small busi- 
nesses would be able to base tax liability on purchases and be paid an admin- 
istration fee to help defray their costs of compliance; this practice is common 
in some states and provinces (Wilson 1989b, p. 22-23).  In December 1990, 
the last feature was scaled back to a one-time credit of no more than $1,000, 
in order to help pay for the reduction of the rate to 7 percent (Ernst and Young 
1990; Whalley and Fretz 1990). 
10.6.6  Agriculture 
Due in part to the zero-rating of basic groceries, the tax treatment of agri- 
culture and fishing is relatively complex. Most output of these sectors would 
be zero-rated, as would much of the major equipment they use. 
31. Such firms could register, in order to take advantage of input credits. The proposal indi- 
cated that the exemption level could be higher under the National Sales Tax (The quasi-BTT) and 
the federal VAT.  I have argued elsewhere that high exemptions under the B'IT create extraordinary 
latitude for evasion of tax through fragmentation of firms; see McLure (1987, pp.  117-23).  That 
was in response to the proposal by  Senator Roth for a BTT exemption of $10 million. 
32.  Japan exempts firms with annual sales of less than  Y 300,000 and assumes for firms with 
sales of less than Y 500 million (roughly USS3.4  million or C$3 million) that purchases equal 80 
percent of  sales (90 percent for wholesalers). This creates a form of  turnover tax, levied at an 
equivalent rate of 0.6 percent (0.3 percent for wholesalers) on sales of these firms. 315  Canadian Sales Tax 
If groceries were taxable, the tax treatment of these sectors would be some- 
what less obvious. There seems, however, to be no reason that they could not 
be subject to tax in the United States. 
10.7  Preparation 
10.7.1  The U.S. Discussion 
One of the most notable findings of the U.S. Treasury Department’s 1984 
VAT  exercise was an estimate by the IRS that introduction of  a VAT  would 
require an additional 20,000 IRS employees and an additional annual expend- 
iture of $700 million (at 1984 levels). In addition, it was estimated that eigh- 
teen months lead time would be required to get ready to implement the tax; 
this time would be needed for the recruitment of agents, public education, and 
other preparati~n.~~  Although these estimates have been questioned (e.g., by 
Tait  1988, ch. 12), it is clear that a VAT  cannot be introduced without ade- 
quate preparation. 
10.7.2  The Canadian Situation 
In August 1989, Wilson stated that draft legislation would be  released in 
early fall, in order to form the basis of technical discussions with business and 
to provide a starting point for planning and developing the systems needed to 
comply with the new tax to be introduced in January 1991. In addition, he 
said, “Well in advance of the start-up of the tax on January 1, 1991, Revenue 
Canada will be working closely with businesses to assist them in preparing for 
the new system. And most important, the government will act to ensure that 
the Canadian public is well-informed in  advance about the GST” (Wilson 
1989b, p. 35). 
Despite growing skepticism in the private sector, Wilson has stated that 
preparation to implement the tax has been adequate, even though the legisla- 
tion was only tabled on January 24, 1990, and has not yet (as of August 1990) 
passed the Senate.34  Public discussion of the VAT  has already stretched over 
three years. Registration forms were mailed to taxpayers in May  1990, and 
taxpayer information bulletins have been distributed. Drafts of tax  returns 
have been prepared but not circulated. 
The Canadian Ministry of  Finance estimates that, whereas administration 
of the existing MST requires 1,500 person-years, administration of the GST 
33.U.S.  Treasury Department (1984, vol. 3, pp. 113, 124, 128). U.S.  Internal Revenue Service 
(1986) estimates that a BTT  extending through the retail level would require more than  16,000 
additional staff members and cost almost $700 million per  year. Note that these estimates are not 
fully comparable, for reasons stated there. 
34.  As indicated in note 1,  the Senate passed the VAT legislation on December 14, 1990, and 
the tax became effective on January  1, 1991. Since business expected the tax to be implemented, 
new price lists and catalogs reflected the VAT. It might have been more inconvenient not to intro- 
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will require an additional 3,400-3,900  person years. The administrative cost 
of the mature system is estimated at $380 million. The estimates are based on 
the assumption of a ratio of 300 taxpayers to each member of the tax admin- 
istration staff this  figure is rather high by  European   standard^.^^  The addi- 
tional personnel are being hired, and regional taxpayer assistance offices are 
being set up. It appears that implementation will occur on schedule,  unless 
the  legislation  fails  to pass  the  Senate, or is  passed  only  with  substantial 
amendment. 
10.8  Sales Taxes in a North American Free-’Ikade Area 
The United States and Canada have recently entered into a free-trade agree- 
ment, and there is talk of eventually including Mexico to form a North Amer- 
ican free-trade area. This prospect raises the important question of whether 
coordination of  sales taxation  in the three  countries would  be  necessary or 
desirable, and how it might be achieved.36  Though a comprehensive discus- 
sion  of  these  issues  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper,  some  preliminary 
thoughts are offered, concentrating on U. S .-Canadian relations. 
At a formal and superficial level one can conclude, if somewhat tautologi- 
cally, that tax harmonization  is not necessary for the creation of  a free-trade 
area, since a free-trade  area involves only the elimination of  import duties 
within the area. Nor is tax harmonization required for the creation of a cus- 
toms union, which involves common external tariffs. But if economic integra- 
tion is to go further, as it has in Europe, tax harmonization will be appropriate. 
The next stage in economic integration, a tax union, clearly requires harmo- 
nization.  Such harmonization  involves the tax bases and perhaps tax rates. 
Harmonization in the EC began with the VAT,  and still does not encompass 
income taxation. 
The problem is even more complicated in North America than in the Euro- 
pean context, because of  the existence of separate state and provincial sales 
taxes in the United States and Canada. It would clearly be easier to contem- 
plate coordination of three unified systems than of one unified system (Mexi- 
co’s) and two nonunified ones. It is conceivable that the federal government 
of the United States will adopt a VAT or a RST and that the state sales taxes 
might  be  merged  into  it, either through  piggybacking  or a  clearinghouse 
mechanism. Moreover,  such a result may yet occur in Canada. But this is far 
from a safe bet; the continued existence of parallel  systems in one or both 
countries seems more likely. For the foreseeable future, that parallel system in 
the United States will take the form of no federal tax and uncoordinated state 
35.  This information was provided in correspondence with the author. 
36. The term “coordination”  is used in  the generic sense of  meshing tax  systems to avoid 
undesirable economic effects or administrative burdens. “Unified is used below to denote a sales 
tax system in which national and subnational taxes are coordinated, as they are in Mexico, where 
there is only one tax, the federal VAT collected by the states and shared with them. 317  Canadian Sales Tax 
taxes. In short, the coordination problem would seem to involve meshing the 
Canadian system of federal VAT  and provincial RSTs with the U.S. system of 
state RSTs and no federal sales tax (and perhaps eventually with the Mexican 
unified VAT  system). 
The combination of free trade, the adoption of the Canadian GST, and the 
continued absence of a federal sales tax in the United States is likely to aggra- 
vate existing problems of  cross-border shopping. Canadians living near the 
U.S.  border can be expected to shop increasingly in  the United States for 
certain goods and services that are taxed in Canada, but not across the border. 
(The same problem exists along the U.S. border with Mexico, but in atten- 
uated form, both because the population of  Mexico is less concentrated near 
the U.S. border and because U.S. and Mexican income levels are quite differ- 
ent.) This effect will be experienced more strongly in some sectors than in 
others, depending on the tax saving involved, the convenience and expense of 
conducting and concealing cross-border shopping, tax treatment under RSTs 
in the United States, and existing treatment under the Canadian MST.  Espe- 
cially heavily affected will be such relatively “big-ticket” and essentially un- 
detectable “importable” activities as domestic air transportation (e.g., flying 
to Vancouver from Detroit, instead of from Toronto) and automobile repairs. 
(International air transportation, including flights to the United States on tick- 
ets not purchased in Canada and domestic connector flights, is tax exempt. 
The law requires self-assessment of services imported for use in Canada; in 
many cases of services provided to households this provision will be impos- 
sible to enforce.) Of course, this point has greater implications for some parts 
of Canada (and the contiguous parts of the United States) than for others. In 
addition, there will be increased pressure on enforcement of rules relating to 
declaration of  values and payment of tax on mail-order sales from the United 
States to Canadian households. (At present, no tax is due if the value is less 
than $40 and the tax and duty due would be less than $5.) There seems to be 
little likelihood that these problems can be avoided, as long as the United 
States has no federal sales tax and the state RSTs do not exceed the provincial 
ones by enough to offset the Canadian federal VAT. 
If the United States adopted a federal sales tax, it would be desirable for the 
two nations (three, with Mexico) to engage in some sort of coordination that 
would reduce the need to implement BTAs on cross-border shipments. 0th- 
erwise, progress in achieving the administrative objectives of  the free-trade 
area by eliminating customs duties would be largely nullified. (This problem 
will arise once the Canadian VAT  is introduced. It generally does not arise 
under the state and provincial taxes. If Mexico were to join the free-trade area 
its VAT would raise the same issues.) There are two obvious alternatives. One 
is to adopt the restricted-origin principle under the VAT:  origin principle for 
trade between Canada and the United States (intra-North  American free-trade 
area trade) and destination principle for trade with other (nonmember) na- 
tions. The other is to adopt a clearing house for tax payments among the two 318  Charles E. McLure, Jr. 
(three)  nations  (see Cnossen  1983,  1990a; Poddar  1990). The former  ap- 
proach has the disadvantage of requiring the same tax rate in both (all three) 
countries. The loss of fiscal sovereignty this entails has caused the European 
Community to delay its implementation since it was first recommended by the 
Neumark Committee in the early 1960s. (In addition, it is not clear that there 
is much administrative benefit, given the need to value exports.) The clearing- 
house technique may be more promising, but the lack of trust that has caused 
its implementation to be resisted in the EC creates some doubt. It might be 
noted that such an approach would be somewhat simpler to operate if both (all 
three) countries had RSTs, rather than VATs. Presumably it could be operated 
if one or two had VATs and one a RST. 
10.9  Concluding Remarks 
The Canadian experience provides several types of  lessons for the United 
States. For convenience, I distinguish between lessons on general issues and 
lessons on special questions.  These are simply stated, with no further docu- 
mentation or argumentation. 37 I conclude by noting that the Canadian model 
is not the one to follow if the United States is to consider adopting a federal 
sales tax. 
10.9.1  General Issues 
First,  if  the United States considers a federal  sales tax, of whatever type, 
the tax should extend through the retail level. 
Second, if relief is to be provided from the regressivity  of the sales tax, it 
should be through explicit transfers or refundable credits, rather than through 
exemption or prorating of selected goods and services. 
Third, it seems unwise, even so, to gamble that the Congress would apply 
one rate to virtually all consumption, especially if the tax is to be used to raise 
substantial revenue. Thus, the BTT should not be considered seriously. This 
view would be strengthened if  it were thought that a joint federal-state BTT 
were under consideration. 
Fourth, the credit-method VAT  has considerable advantages over the RST, 
despite the relative simplicity and familiarity of the latter. 
Fifth, there is no good answer to the problem of intergovernmental compe- 
tition and coordination in this area. The two most promising approaches seem 
to  be:  a  federal  credit-method  VAT  with  a clearing-house  arrangement  to 
37.  I do not bother to discuss issues about which there is neither much disagreement nor much 
Canadian debate, such as the superiority of the consumption base and the destination principle 
and the inferiority of the addition method. See, however, McLure (1987). It should also be.  noted 
that several features of  the Canadian proposals reflect the prior existence of the MST. These in- 
clude the decision not to zero-rate the activities of nonprofit organizations. Such considerations 
are not relevant for the United States and are not discussed. In addition, I do not discuss transition 
issues. which would not arise in the United States. 319  Canadian Sales Tax 
channel revenues to the state of  destination of  revenues; and a federal RST 
with state piggybacking. It appears that there would be considerable loss of 
state fiscal autonomy under any administratively feasible system. 
Sixth, it is essential that taxpayers be prepared to implement any new fed- 
eral sales tax. 
Seventh, the introduction of the Canadian GST will aggravate problems of 
cross-border shopping and stymie efforts to allow trade to cross the interna- 
tional border with a minimum of delay. Adoption of a sales tax in the United 
States would reduce the first of these problems but would increase the need 
for administrative coordination between the two countries. 
10.9.2  Special Questions 
Food.  One can only look to the proposed Canadian treatment of  food with 
amazement. Rather than following the lead of  New Zealand in introducing a 
relatively “clean” VAT,  and after explicitly acknowledging the benefits of such 
a system, the government proposed a needlessly complicated form that zero- 
rates basic groceries. The United States should not follow Canada’s lead. 
Housing. The taxation of housing is problematic. Taxing the first sale of  all 
housing is preferable to taxing new housing, but is politically difficult. If  re- 
bates for taxes on housing are to be provided, they should be designed with 
more attention to detail than the Canadian scheme exhibits. 
Financial Institutions. As is well known, the taxation of the financial sector is 
extremely difficult. It might be better to zero-rate the sector than to exempt it, 
as Canada proposes. 
Nonprofit Organizations. Rather than simply zero-rating the charitable activi- 
ties of nonprofit organizations and the MUSH sector, Canada proposes to ex- 
empt them and pay partial rebates of tax. This seems to be needlessly compli- 
cated. 
Small Business. The treatment of small business seems relatively generous by 
world standards. Such an exemption may not be needed in the United States. 
Agriculture. That most agriculture will be zero-rated in Canada should have 
little relevance for the United States, since that feature of the proposal reflects 
primarily the decision to zero-rate basic groceries. If groceries are taxed, as is 
proper, agriculture should also be taxable. 
10.9.3  Whose Lead to Follow 
Despite the defects identified in this paper, Canada’s VAT may not be mark- 
edly worse than those of  the European Community. At  least it has only one 320  Charles E. McLure, Jr. 
positive rate, and most exempt sales (residential sales, day care, education, 
health and dental services, etc.) are by those like the MUSH sector, who sell 
mostly to final consumers and make few taxable sales. Yet  the Canadian VAT 
seems to be the wrong standard for comparison. It is decidedly inferior to the 
New Zealand tax, which is a more appropriate benchmark-and  is the system 
the United States should emulate. 
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